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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (j) of the Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1)

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that a Rule

60(b) motion may not be used as a vehicle to remedy an alleged
mistake of law by the trial court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

A trial court's ruling on a Rule 60(b)

motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion in determining
whether a movant has shown Rule 60(b) grounds.

Franklin Covey

Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2 P.3d 451, 456-457 (Utah App.
2000). " 'An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the
propriety of the denial or grant of relief,'" and thus "'is
narrow in scope.!" Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307, 312 (Utah App.
2001). However, the appellate court can "reach the merits of the
underlying judgment from which relief was sought," to determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion. A decision
premised on flawed legal conclusions, for instance, constitutes
an abuse of discretion. Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307, 312 (Utah
App. 2001) .
2)

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that

a motion is not a proper method to extend a judgment for an
additional eight years.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's interpretation of
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statutes and a prior judicial decision is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d
1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Billincrs v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918
P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996);

State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857, 858

(Utah 1994).
COURT RULE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders
or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time
of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal
is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and
for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a
party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining
any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case.

This case involves a dispute of whether a judgment may be
renewed by motion , and whether a Rule 60(b) (1) motion is the
proper vehicle to redress an alleged mistake of law by the trial
court. The appellant/cross-appellee

("Bybee") filed a Rule 60(b)

motion to set aside orders of the trial court obtained by motion
extending for an additional eight years the judgment obtained by
appellee/cross-appellant

("Fisher"). This appeal is from the

trial court's order denying Bybee's motion to set aside the
orders.
II.

Course of Proceedings

On October 6, 1992, Fisher filed a complaint against Bybee
and others for their failure to make payments pursuant to a
contract for the purchase of Fisher's car wash business and for
taking funds belonging to Fisher from the business. (R. at 1-8).
After the complaint was filed and served on the defendants, Bybee
fought against a pre-judgment writ of garnishment but failed to
file an answer.(R. at 36). Entry of Default was filed against
Bybee on March 31, 1993. (R. at 64-65).

And a default judgment

was filed against Bybee on May 10, 1993. (R. at 70-71). On May
12, 1993, notice of the entry of the default judgment was mailed
to Bybee. (R. at 72-75).
Fisher was unsuccessful in several attempts to collect on
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the judgment. (R. at 86-87). Therefore, on February 8, 2001,
Fisher filed an ex-parte motion, memorandum, and affidavit to
extend the judgment ("ex-parte motion").

(R. at 85-90). The trial

court issued its order extending the judgment on February 8,
2001.

(R. at 91-92). On February 12, 2001, Fisher mailed a copy

of the ex-parte motion, memorandum, affidavit and unsigned order
to Bybee. (R. at 161, 145-155).
Since Bybee had not been served with the motion prior to the
trial court issuing its order extending judgment, on February 21,
2001, Fisher drafted and mailed a motion and memorandum and
affidavit to extend the judgment to Bybee. (R. at 161, 137-143).
On March 23, 2 001, Fisher again sent to Bybee a copy of the
motion, memorandum, and affidavit to extend the judgment,
("second motion to extend judgment")(R. at 161, 93, 95, 129-135).
Fisher filed the second motion to extend the judgment with the
court on March 26, 2001 (R. at 93-99). (R. at 93 & 95). Bybee
failed to respond, and the trial court entered its order
extending the judgment on April 17, 2001. (R. at 100-101).
On July 15, 2001, Bybee through counsel filed a Rule
60(b) (1) motion to set aside the February 8th and April 17th
orders extending judgment. (R. at 106). Bybee argued that the
orders should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) because the
trial court committed a mistake of law by issuing an order to
extend the judgment on a motion when a judgment can only be
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extended by the filing of a new law suit. (R. at 109-111). Bybee
also argued that the February 8th order to extend the judgment
should be set aside under Rule 60 (b) (6) because he was denied due
process since he did not receive notice of the ex-parte motion
filed on February 8, 2001. (R. at 108-109).
On March 5, 2002, the trial court filed its Ruling holding
that the proper forum to remedy an alleged mistake of fundamental
law by the trial court where a final order has been issued, is in
the appellate court and not by a Rule 60(b) motion filed in the
trial court. The trial court also held that filing a new
complaint is the only method to extend a judgment.

(R. at 175-

182) .
III.
1.

Statement of Facts.

On October 6, 1992, Fisher filed a complaint against

Bybee and others for their failure to make payments pursuant to a
contract for the purchase of Fisher's car wash business and for
taking funds belonging to Fisher from the business. (R. at 1-8).
2.

The complaint was initially filed on October 6, 1992

as Civil No. 92-0400636.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Ray M.

Harding [Sr.] signed a Transfer Order transferring the case to
Circuit Court which assigned the case Civil No. 920-3313. When
the state of Utah eliminated Circuit Courts, the case was
transferred back to the District Court, and re-assigned Civil No.
92-0400636. The two case numbers are cross-referenced as being
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combined, therefore documents filed under both 920-3313 or 920400636 are filed by the court in the same file. (R. at 39-40,
57, 160-161).
3.

On October 8, 1992, Fisher filed a Motion for

Prejudgment Writ of Garnishment. (R. at 7-8).
4.

The trial court issued a Prejudgment Writ of

Garnishment on Oct 13, 1992. ( R. at 20-22).
5.

On October 15, 1992, Bybee filed an objection to the

pre-judgment writ of garnishment through his attorney and also
filed a personal affidavit. (R. at 23-34).
6.

On October 16, 1992, the trial court issued an order

for the release of the prejudgment writ of garnishment. (R. at
44-45) .
7.

Bybee failed to file an answer to the complaint, and

on March 31, 1993, Entry of Default was filed against Bybee. (R.
at 64-65) .
8.

On May 10, 1993, a default judgment was filed against

Bybee. (R. at 70-71).
9.

On May 12, 1993, notice of the entry of the default

judgment was mailed to Bybee. (R. at 72-75) .
10.

On February 5, 1997, in an attempt to collect on the

judgment, Bybee was served with a Motion and an Order for
Supplemental Proceedings. (R. at 76).
11.

Fisher was unsuccessful in several attempts to collect
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on the judgment. (R. at 86-87).
12.

On February 8, 2001, Fisher filed an ex-parte motion,

memorandum, and affidavit to extend the judgment ("ex-parte
motion to extend judgment") . (R. at 85-90) .
13.

On February 8, 2001, the trial court issued its order

extending the judgment. (R. at 91-92).
14.

On February 12, 2001, Fisher mailed a copy of the ex-

parte motion, memorandum, affidavit and a copy of the order,
which was unsigned, to Bybee. (R. at 161; See R. at 145-155).
15.

On February 21, 2 001, in order to give Bybee an

opportunity to respond to the motion to extend the judgment,
Fisher drafted and mailed a motion, memorandum and affidavit to
extend the judgment, to Bybee. ("motion to extend judgment"). (R.
at 161; See R. at 137-143).
16.

On March 23, 2001, Fisher again sent to Bybee a copy

of the motion, memorandum and affidavit to extend the judgment.
("second motion to extend judgment") (R. at 161; See R. at 93-99
and 129-135) .
17.

On March 26, 2001, the second motion to extend

judgment was filed with the court. (R. at 93-99).
18.

Bybee received copies of the motion, memorandum, and

affidavit but chose not to respond because he believed that a
motion was not the correct procedure for renewing a judgment. (R.
at 112) .
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19.

On April 17, 2001, the trial court entered its order

extending the judgment. (R. at 100-101).
20.

On July 15, 2001, Bybee through counsel filed a Rule

60(b)(1) motion to set aside the orders extending judgment. (R.
at 106) .
21.

Bybee argued that the February 8th and April 17th

orders should be set aside because the trial court committed a
mistake of law by issuing the orders because a judgment can only
be extended by the filing of a new complaint and not by motion.
(R. at 109-111).
22.

He also argued that the February 8th order to extend

the judgment should be set aside under Rule 60(b)(6) because
Bybee was denied due process since he did not receive notice of
the ex-parte motion filed on February 8, 2001. (R. at 108-109).
23.

On March 5, 2002, the trial court filed its Ruling on

Bybee's Rule 60(b) (1) motion holding that the proper forum to
remedy an alleged mistake of fundamental law by the trial court
where a final order has been issued, is an appellate court and
not a Rule 60(b) motion filed in the trial court. The trial court
also held that the only method to renew a judgment is the filing
of a new complaint. (R. at 175-182) .
24.

On May 8, 2002, Bybee filed a notice of appeal of the

entire order of the trial court. (R. at 186-187).
25.

On May 16, 2002, Fisher filed a notice of cross appeal
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of that portion of the trial court's order holding that the
renewal of a judgment is only accomplished through the filing of
a complaint. (R. at 193-194).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Rule 60(b)(1), Utah R. Civ. P. is not the proper vehicle to
challenge an alleged mistake of law by the trial court.
The trial court was correct in holding that the proper forum

to remedy a mistake of fundamental law by a trial court where a
final order has been issued, is an appeal to the appellate court
or the filing of a Rule 59 motion.

A Rule 60(b) Motion is to be

utilized to correct inadvertent judicial oversight not to remedy
a mistake of law by the trial court. A fundamental mistake of law
by the trial court is to be redressed by an appeal or a motion
for new trial. Franklin Covey, at p. 456-7.
Prior to the Franklin Covey decision, a Rule 60(b) motion
was the proper vehicle to challenge an alleged mistake by the
trial court in fundamental law. Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275,
277 (Utah App. 1995) . However, Franklin Covey changed the law.
The Franklin Covey court determined that a "mistake" entitling an
appellant to challenge a trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b)
motion does not include the trial court's fundamental
misconception of the law. The policy behind the appellate court's
decision is to prevent a party from escaping the consequences of
failing to file a timely appeal. Otherwise, a party who failed to
make a timely appeal challenging the trial court's conception of
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the law would avoid the consequence of losing the right to appeal
by filing a Rule 60(b) motion. Thus, Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure requiring that an appeal be filed within
3 0 days after a final judgment is entered would be meaningless
when alleged errors of law by the trial court are presented to
appellate courts.
Rule 59(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
specifically provides that the court may alter or amend the
judgment if there is an error in law by filing a motion within 10
days after the entry of judgment. If a party can challenge an
alleged mistake of law by the trial court through a Rule 60(b)
motion, then Rule 59 becomes meaningless because its requirement
to file the motion within 10 days of entry of judgment to insure
speedy disposition and finality of cases is circumvented.
Therefore, the trial court was correct in holding that a
Rule 60(b) (1) motion cannot be used to extend the time within
which to file a notice of appeal and forestall the disposition
and finality of cases.
2.

A judgment may be renewed by motion.
It is not clear in Utah whether a motion is the only method

to renew a judgment. There is no statue that governs the proper
method(s) to renew a judgment and there are no cases that
directly address the issue. However, there is a suggestion in
case law that the only method to renew a judgment is by the
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filing of a new complaint.
Whether or not Utah law requires that the only method to
renew a judgment is the filing of a new complaint and its service
on the judgment debtor, there is no sound reason to prohibit the
renewing of a judgment by motion.

However, there are sound

reasons to permit the renewing of a judgment by motion.
Utah treats the renewal of a judgment as a continuation of
the original proceeding, with the trial court having jurisdiction
by virtue of the filing of the complaint in the original
proceeding and its service on the judgment debtor.

Therefore,

the trial court has jurisdiction and it is not necessary to file
a new complaint and serve it on the defendant to confer
jurisdiction on the trial court. And since the defendant is given
notice of the nature and basis of the renewal action by the
motion's pleadings which are served on him, it is not necessary
to file a new complaint and serve it on the defendant.
Therefore, the filing of a motion and its service on the
judgment debtor should be, if it is not, a proper method to renew
a judgment in Utah.
ARGUMENT
I.

A,

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED BYBEE'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE APRIL 17 T H ORDER
ON THE BASIS THAT RULE 60(B)(1) COULD NOT BE USED TO
CORRECT A MISTAKE OF LAW.

Utah case law establishes that an alleged mistake of law
cannot be redressed by a Rule 60(b) motion*
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Rule 60(b) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
in relevant part that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect;...".

Bybee claims that "mistake"

includes mistakes of law by the trial court and therefore, a
party may challenge an alleged mistake in law by the trial court
by filing a Rule 60(b)(1) motion.
However, Utah law is clear that a Rule 60(b) (1) motion is
not the proper vehicle to challenge an alleged mistake of law by
the trial court. Franklin Covey, at p. 456-7.

Rule 60(b) (1) is

to be used to correct inadvertent judicial oversight and not
alleged judicial mistakes of law. Franklin Covey, at p. 457.

The

proper vehicle to challenge an alleged mistake of law by the
trial court is a Rule 59 motion for a new trial or an appeal.
Franklin Covey, at p. 457.

Therefore, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Bybee's Rule 60(b) motion.
B.

Requiring a party to challenge an alleged mistake of law by
the trial court through a Rule 59 motion or by appeal
preserves the speedy disposition and finality of cases and
prevents a party from escaping the consequences of failing
to file a timely appeal.
Bybee argues that prior to the ruling in Franklin Covey,

Utah law allowed a challenge to a trial court's mistake of law by
a Rule 60(b) motion and that the Franklin Covey court was wrong
12

in changing the law. However, the Franklin Covey court correctly
determined that allowing a party to challenge an alleged mistake
of law by the trial court through a Rule 60(b) motion would
effectively extend the time to appeal without the need to show
excusable neglect or good cause.

Thus, Rule 4 of the Utah Rules

of Appellate Procedure could easily be circumvented and would be
irrelevant when appealing errors of law.
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires
that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the
date of the entry of the judgment or order. Only upon a showing
of excusable neglect or good cause may the court extend the time
for filing a notice of appeal an additional 30 days. Rule 4(e),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because Rule 60(b) does not
toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, a party loses the
right to appeal the trial court's judgment or order if a notice
of appeal is not filed within 3 0 days of entry of the judgment or
order. Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
If a party is permitted to file a Rule 60 (b) (1) motion to
challenge an alleged mistake of law by the trial court, it can
ignore Rule 4(a) and file a Rule 60(b) (1) motion up to 3 months
after entry of the judgment or order to appeal the trial court's
alleged mistake of law.

Thus, by filing a Rule 60(b)(1) motion,

a party can extend the time to file an appeal without a showing
of excusable neglect or good cause.
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And since the trial court

may not rule on the Rule 60(b)(1) motion for a month or longer
after it is filed, a party could have 4 months or longer to file
an appeal instead of 3 0 days as required by Rule 4 (a) .
A Rule 60(b)(1) motion should not relieve a party from the
requirement to file a timely appeal on errors of law by the trial
court. Otherwise, Rule 4(a) would be irrelevant because a party
could correct his failure to file a timely appeal by filing a
Rule 60(b)(1) motion. To prevent a party from avoiding the
consequences of failing to file a timely appeal under Rule 4 (a) ,
a challenge to an alleged mistake of law by the trial court
should not be a basis for relief under Rule 60(b) (1) .
....The policy behind such a reading of [Rule]
60(b) is clear; parties should not be allowed to
escape the consequences of their failure to file a
timely appeal by addressing questions of law to
the trial court for reconsideration. That is the
function of appellate.... (Emphasis added).
Franklin Covey at p. 456-457, Quoting Parke-Chapley Constr. Go.
v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 1989).
If "mistake" includes an error of law by the trial court,
then Rule 60(b) also undermines Rule 59(a)(7) and makes it
irrelevant. Rule 59(a) (7) provides that a party may request the
trial court to grant a new trial, to amend the judgment or to
direct that a new judgment be entered if there has been an error
in law. Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 59(a)(7).

Rule 59(b) also insures

the speedy disposition and finality of cases by requiring the
motion to be filed within 10 days after the entry of judgment.
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Contrarily, under Rule 60(b)(1) a party can file a motion 90
days after entry of judgment. Thus, a party would not file a Rule
59(a)(7) motion because Rule 60(b)(1) provides an additional 80
days to file a motion challenging an alleged mistake of law by
the trial court. Thus, the speedy disposition and finality of
cases insured by Rule 59(b) is lost.
A contrary view, that 'mistake' means any type of
judicial error, makes relief under the rule for
error of law as extensive as that available under
Rule 59(e), which permits motions to 'alter or
amend judgments.' Obviously any such motion
presupposes a mistake. Indeed, the argument
advanced is that a broad construction of 'mistake'
beneficially extends the ten-day limit for motions
under Rule 59(e). Calling this a benefit loses
sight of the complementary interest in speedy
disposition and finality, clearly intended by Rule
59. Attempts to allay criticism on this score by
saying that the 'reasonable time' for filing a
Rule 60(b) motion when it seeks reconsideration on
a point of law is the appeal period, are an
acknowledgment of the extent to which this
construction of mistake undermines Rule 59 (e) .
They also overlook the fact that subsection (2) of
Rule 60(b), permitting a motion for new trial to
be filed after the ten days specified in Rule
59(b), requires a showing why it could not have
been filed earlier. If by 'mistake' the rule
contemplates motions for. reconsideration of pure
points of law, there is no comparable requirement
of diligence, although, prima facie, there would
seem to be even less reason for delay.
Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1267-814 (1st Cir.1971).
A majority of federal courts have also held that a Rule
69(b) motion is not the proper vehicle to challenge an alleged
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mistake of law by the trial court.1

Silk v. Sandoval, at p.

1267. (" [i]f a court merely wrongly decided a point of law, that
is not '[mistake], inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.'); Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 156, 158-159 (3rd Cir.
1988) ("legal error, without more, cannot justify granting a Rule
60(b) motion."); United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 312
(4th Cir. 1981) ("Rule 69(b) does not authorize a motion merely
for reconsideration of a legal issue...Where the motion is
nothing more than a request that the district court change his
mind,...it is not authorized by Rule 60(b)."); Parke-Chapley
Constr. Co. v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 914-915 & n. 7 (7th
Cir. 1989)("this Court, however, has held that an appeal or
motion for a new trial, rather than a FRCP 60(b) motion, is the
proper avenue to address mistakes of law committed by the
judge."); Spinar v. Board of Regents of South Dakota, 7 96 F.2d
1060, 1062, (8th Cir. 1986) ("In other words, the motion asserts
that the District Court made a legal error. So construed, the
motion does not set forth a ground for relief cognizable under
Rule 60 (b) .") .
Other Federal Courts allow a challenge to alleged mistakes
of law through Rule 60(b)(1) motions but only if the motion is

interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are
"substantially similar" to the federal rules. Lund v. Brown, 2000
UT 75, % 26, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah, Sep 22, 2000).
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filed within the period for filing a timely appeal. International
Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 669 (2nd Cir. 1977)

("a

motion for relief from such judicial mistakes under Rule 60(b)(1)
may not be made after the time for appeal has elapsed"); Pierce
v. United Mine Workers, 770 F.2d 449, 451 (6th Cir. 1985)("this
court has recognized a claim of legal error as subsumed in the
category of mistake under Rule 60(b)(1) . [citation omitted] a
Rule 60(b) (1) motion based on legal error must be brought within
the normal time for appeal."); Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231,
234-235 (6th Cir. 1983)(time limit is needed to preserve time
limit of Rule 59 and to reserve finality of judgments.); Morris
v. Adams-Millis Corp., 758 F.2d 1352, 1358-1359(10th Cir.
1985) ( [W]e have recognized that in some instances relief has been
granted under 60(b) (1) on a theory of mistake of law. [citation
omitted]

However, we are of the view that a mistake of law

cannot be reached under 60(b)(1) where no notice of appeal was
timely filed from the order in which the mistake is alleged to
have occurred, and the time for filing such a notice of appeal
had expired when the 60(b) motion was filed, a contrary rule
would permit a 60(b) motion to serve as an appeal, which would be
untimely otherwise.").
Since the Franklin Covey decision preserves the speedy
disposition of cases and does not allow parties to escape the
consequences of failing to file a timely appeal it should not be
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overruled.
C.

The Franklin Covey case is not distinguishable from the
present matter.

1).

A Rule 59 motion was available to Bybee.
Bybee also argues that a Rule 59(a)(7) motion was not

available to Bybee as it was in the Franklin Covey case because a
Rule 59(a) (7) motion can be utilized only after the entry of
judgment following trial or summary judgment and cites Interstate
Land Corp. v. Patterson 797 P.2d 1101 (Utah App. 1990) as
authority for that proposition. However, the Interstate Land case
stands for the proposition that a Rule 59 motion may follow any
decision made by the court.
This court, in Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v.
Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125
(Utah Ct.App.1988), held that a Rule 59 motion for
a new trial is procedurally correct following a
summary judgment. The court stated: " [tlhe
concept of a new trial under Rule 59 is broad
enough to include a rehearing of any matter
decided by the court without a jury." While there
may be some logic in concluding that there can be
no new trial where no trial has yet occurred, we
should be less concerned with what this
"reconsideration" procedure may be called so long
as the procedure is available to litigants.
(Emphasis added.)
Interstate Land Corp., at p. 1105.*
The Interstate Land Corp. court recognized that a new trial
under Rule 5 9 includes any matter decided by the trial court
without a jury.

Therefore, a Rule 59(a)(7) motion is to correct

an error in law even though that error occurred in a motion.
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Hence, a Rule 59 motion is the proper vehicle to have a trial
court consider an alleged error in law made in a motion.
2).

The Trial Court's alleged error did not result from the
inadvertent grant of a flawed but unopposed motion.
Byee argues that the error in the Franklin Covey case was

not an error of law committed by the trial court but a clerical
error that can be addressed through a Rule 60(b) (1) motion. Bybee
states that the trial court committed clerical error because it
did not carefully review the grounds stated in the motion for the
relief requested or it would have realized that a judgment could
not be renewed by motion.
Clerical error occurs when a judgment fails to reflect the
court's true intent. Bank of California v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
709 F.2d 1174, 1178 (7th Cir. 1983)(when a judgment fails to
reflect the court's true intent, the error could be called
"clerical" rather than legal). However, as Bybee's failure to
cite to the record reveals, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the court did not intend to renew the judgment by
motion. On the contrary, the fact that the trial court signed
orders extending the judgment on two separate occasions indicates
that it understood and intended that the judgment be renewed by
motion. In addition, to conclude that the trial court did not
review the motions, memoranda, affidavits, and orders would
assume that the trial court signs orders without knowledge of the
relief requested, the parties involved, or the grounds for the
19

relief requested, which is unreasonable and without support in
the record. The motions, memoranda, affidavits, and orders
specifically referred to renewing the judgment, and the trial
court did review them.
3).

Bvbee could have filed an appeal within 3 0 days of entry of
the court's April 17th Order.
Bybee argues that his case does not present the same concern

of escaping the consequences of failing to file a timely appeal
as did the Franklin Covey case because Bybee did not have the
opportunity to file a timely appeal since he did not receive a
copy of the April 17th order.
The consequence of choosing to file a Rule 60(b) (1) motion
is that the time for filing a notice of appeal begins to run when
judgment is entered, even though notice of the judgment has not
been given. Workman v. Nagle Const., Inc., 802 P.2d 749,750 (Utah
App. 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(d).

Therefore, the failure to

give notice of the judgment does not preclude the effectiveness
of the judgment, but is harmless error and notice to a party of
the entry of the judgment is not a prerequisite to its
effectiveness. Workman, at p. 750.

By choosing to file a Rule

60(b)(1) motion instead of a Rule 59(a)(7) motion or a notice of
appeal, Bybee lost his right to appeal, even though he may not
have received a copy of the order.
Bybee argues that a copy of the order was not sent to Bybee
in violation of Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial
20

Administration. However, the Rule specifically applies to counsel
of the parties and does not mention that proposed orders must be
delivered to the parties. Rule 4-504(2), Code of Judicial
Administration.

In any event, the time for filing a notice of

appeal begins to run when judgment is entered, even though notice
of the judgment has not been given. Workman, at p. 75 0.
D.

Ruling that Bybee cannot challenge an alleged error of law
by the trial court through a Rule 60(b)(1) motion does not
deny him the ability to present his claim to the trial court
prior to appeal or to have his claim reviewed on appeal.
Ruling that a Rule 60(b)(1) motion cannot be used to

challenge an alleged mistake of law by the trial court does not
deprive Bybee of the ability to present his claim to the trial
court prior to appeal and does not cause Bybee to lose the right
to assert his claim on appeal.
To preserve an issue for appeal: (1) the issue must be
raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically
raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d
844, 847 (Utah 1998). Once the issue is placed before the trial
court and the trial court has an opportunity to consider the
issue, the issue is preserved for appeal. Badger, at p. 847.
Bybee, by filing a memorandum in opposition to Fisher's
motion to extend the judgment or by filing a Rule 59 motion,
would have specifically raised his claim before the trial court
in a timely fashion. Once Bybee had raised his claim through
21

either a response to Fisher's motion or through a Rule 59 motion,
the trial court would have considered his claim and his claim
would have been preserved for appeal. Badger, at p. 84 7.
Bybee argues that Gill v. Timm stands for the proposition
that the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address
a claimed error of law. In Gill, the Defendant had not pled the
affirmative defense of mitigation of damages, did not present
evidence of the defense, or ever request the trial court to amend
his pleadings to include that defense. Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d
1352 (Utah 1986). The Gill court concluded that mitigation of
damages was not specifically raised nor raised in a timely
fashion preventing the trial court from ever considering whether
Defendant could claim the affirmative defense. However, Bybee
could have specifically raised in a timely fashion and had the
court consider his claim by filing either a memorandum in
opposition to Fisher's motion to extend the judgment or by filing
a Rule 59 motion, but he chose to do neither.
E.

The February 8th order should be set aside.
Fisher agrees that the February 8th order should be set

aside.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT WRONGLY CONCLUDED THAT A JUDGMENT CANNOT BE
RENEWED BY MOTION.

A.

Utah law is not clear on the methods to be used to renew a
judgment.
The procedure in Utah to renew a judgment is not clear and

there is no statute that directly addresses the proper procedure
to be followed in renewing a judgment. There is a suggestion in
Utah case law that the only method to renew a judgment is by
filing a complaint and serving it on the judgment debtor.
In Youngdale v. Burton, 128 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 1942), the
Utah Supreme Court in holding that a money judgment could not be
renewed under Section 104-37-6, R.S.U.1933, stated: "A money
judgment forms the basis for but two legal proceedings: (a) A
suit thereon, brought within eight years, wherein it forms the
basis or chose [sic] in action for a new judgment, or (b) Some
form of proceedings in execution for collection."

However, it

seems unlikely that the Youngdale court intended by its language
to limit the methods of renewing a judgment to the filing of a
new complaint since the statute being considered by the Youngdale
court specifically provided that a judgment other than a money
judgment could be renewed by the filing of a motion.
In all cases the judgment may be enforced or
carried into execution after the lapse of eight
years from the date of its entry by leave of the
court, upon motion, or by judgment for that
purpose founded upon supplemental pleadings; but
nothing in this section shall be construed to
revive a judgment for the recovery of money which
has been barred by a statute of limitations.
23

(Emphasis added).
Youngdale, at p. 10 53.
Since a non-money judgment could be renewed by motion under the
statute, it seems reasonable that a money judgment could also be
renewed by motion before the lapse of eight years.
Other Utah cases contain the language of the Youngdale case.
See i.e. Yercrensen v. Ford, 402 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1965); Gass
v. Huntington, Utah, 561 P.2d 1071, 1072 (1977); Mason v. Mason,
597 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Utah 1979) . However, there are no Utah cases
that directly address whether a judgment may be renewed by motion
and in all of the reported cases in Utah, the judgment creditor
has proceeded by filing a complaint and serving it on the
judgment debtor. See e.g. Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 8 00
P.2d 795 (Utah 1990); Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah
1988); Guenther v. Guenther, 749 P.2d 628 (Utah 1988); Orton v.
Adams, 21 Utah 2d 245, 444 P.2d 62 (Utah 1968); Campbell v.
Peter, 108 Utah 565, 162 P.2d 754 (Utah 1945) .
B.

There is no sound reason why a judgment may not be renewed
by motion.
Whether or not Utah case law establishes that the only

method to renew a judgment is by the filing of a new complaint
and serving it on the judgment debtor, there is no sound reason
why a renewcil of a judgment may not proceed by motion with
appropriate service on the judgment debtor. McCarthy v. Johnson,
35 F. Supp. 2d. 846,848 (D. Utah 1997).
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1).

A renewal of a judgment is a continuation of the original
proceedings and therefore may proceed by motion.
Other jurisdictions have held that a judgment may be renewed

by Motion.
...the revival of a judgment may be ordered on
motion, application, or affidavit, provided the
judgment debtor,..., is given due and sufficient
notice of such motion or application and an
opportunity to contest it. As a general rule, this
remedy is not a substitute for, but is in addition
to, an action on the judgment..., and has been
regarded as a continuation of the original suit.
50 C.J.S., Judgments §653, p.196 (1997) (Citations omitted).
Utah treats a renewal of a judgment as a continuation of the
original proceedings
However,
which is
American
simply a

we believe the better line of reasoning,
followed by Utah and the majority of
jurisdictions, treats a renewal action as
continuation of the original proceeding.

Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah App. 1993).
The Von Hake court further stated:
Under Utah law, "[a] renewal is not an attempt to
enforce, collect, or expand the original
judgment." Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 8 00
P.2d 795, 797 (Utah 1990) (holding that an action
to renew a judgment against a debtor does not
violate the automatic stay provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code). Instead, in seeking to renew a
judgment, a party is "only trying to maintain the
status quo by preventing the judgment's lapse
under the statute of limitations." Id. Accordingly, Utah law treats a renewal action, at least
in other contexts, as merely a continuation of the
original proceeding and not as a new and
independent action.
Von Hake, at p. 196.
Since Utah treats the renewal of a judgment as a
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continuation of the original proceedings, there is no reason that
a renewal of a judgment may not be accomplished by motion. And to
require that the only method to renew a judgment is the filing of
a new complaint is placing form over substance.
The reasons for requiring the filing of a complaint and
serving it on the defendant is to confer jurisdiction upon the
trial court and to give the defendant "fair notice of the nature
and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication of the
type of litigation involved." Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 3(b);
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955) .
However, where a proceeding is considered to be a
continuance of the original proceeding, there is no need to file
a new complaiint and serve it on the defendant to confer
jurisdiction on the trial court. Von Hake, at p. 196.

The trial

court has jurisdiction by virtue of the filing of the complaint
and its service on the defendant in the original proceeding. Von
Hake, at p. 196. And the motion documents being served on the
defendant insures that the defendant is given notice of the
nature and basis of the claim and a general indication of the
type of litigation involved.
Because Utah law recognizes that a renewal proceeding is a
continuation of the original proceeding, that the trial court has
jurisdiction in a renewal proceeding by virtue of the original
complaint being filed and served on the judgment debtor, and that
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the judgment debtor receives notice that the judgment creditor is
seeking to renew the judgment by being served with the motion
documents, there is no sound reason why a judgment may not be
renewed by motion.
There are additional reasons to permit a renewal of a
judgment by motion. First, there is a savings of the fees to file
the complaint and the costs of drafting a new complaint which is
normally greater than the cost of drafting a motion. Second,
there is a savings of time and costs by the court as well as by
the parties associated with the prosecution of the claims in a
complaint. The drafting of the documents for a motion and the
hearing on that motion require less time and costs to complete
than the filing of a complaint, performing discovery, preparing
and filing a motion for summary judgment, preparing for trial,
and conducting the trial. Thus, there is less time expended by
the parties and the court and less expense for the parties if a
judgment may be renewed by motion.
Other jurisdictions, have used scire facias proceedings to
renew a judgment.

Bank of Edwardsville v. Raffaelle, 3 81 111.

486, 45 N.E.2d 651, 653 (1942); State v. Kirkwood, 361 Mo. 1194,
239 S.W.2d 332, 334 (1951); Berly v. Sias, 255 S.W.2d 505, 508
(Tex. 1953); Kronstadt v. Kronstadt, 238 N.J.Super. 614, 570 A.2d
485, 487-88 (1990); Duffy v. Hartsock, 187 Va. 406, 46 S.E.2d
570, 574 (1948) .
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We agree with the conclusion of law of the
Honorable Court of Civil Appeals in holding that
the motion to revive the judgment was a scire
facias proceeding and not a suit for debt on the
judgment. We agree also with their holding that a
motion for scire
facias
is not an independent suit
but is a continuation of the original suit. As a
continuation of the original suit it is supported
by the jurisdiction of the person obtained in the
original case.
Berly v. Sias, 255 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1953). (Cited by the
Utah Appellate Court in Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 196
(Utah App. 1993)).
Scire

facias

is essentially the filing of a motion to obtain

an order requiring the defendant to show cause why the judgment
should not be renewed. However, even in jurisdictions where a
scire

facias

proceeding has been changed to an order to show

cause, it is not necessary to use an order to show cause but any
appropriate motion may be utilized.
The scire
facias
proceeding has been replaced in
New Jersey by an order to show cause, R. 4:52-1
(79 C.J.S., Scire Facias § 2 ) , although there
would be no impediment to proceeding by motion,
which in this instance would be in the nature of
motion for summary judgment, R. 4:46-1 et seq.
Kronstadt v. Kronstadt, 238 N.J.Super. 614, 570 A.2d 485, 487
(1990) .
Therefore, since a proceeding for the

renewal of a judgment

is a continuation of the original proceeding, renewal of the
judgment by motion should be a proper method to renew a judgment
in Utah.
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2).

Bybee was served with the motion, memorandum, and affidavit.
The procedure to be followed in renewing a judgment requires

that Bybee receive notice of the proceeding. 5 0 C.J.S., Judgments
§653, p. 196 (1997). Bybee did receive notice of the renewal
proceeding. The motion, memorandum, and affidavit to extend the
judgment were mailed to Bybee pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule
5(b)(1). (R. at 93 & 95). And Bybee admits that he received the
motion, memorandum, and affidavit to extend the judgment and that
he chose not to respond.(R. at 112).
CONCLUSION
A Rule 60(b) (1) motion is not a proper vehicle to redress an
alleged mistake of law by the trial court. Therefore, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that a Rule 60(b) (1)
motion is not a proper vehicle to redress an alleged error of law
committed by the trial court and the trial court's ruling should
be affirmed.
A judgment may be renewed by the filing of a motion and its
service on the judgment creditor. Therefore, the trial court
erred in concluding that the only method to renew a judgment is
by the filing of a new complaint and the trial court's ruling
should be overruled.
DATED this >>

day of March, 2003.

S ^ ^ ,
DARW^-&^£ISHER
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Addenda

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DARWIN C. FISHER, and CHERYL
FISHER,

CASE NUMBER: 920003313
DATED: MARCH 5, 2002

Plaintiffs,
vs.

RULING
G. EVAN BYBEE, DENNIS GAY,
and, SUMMERHAWK, dba CITIOIL,
ANTHONY W. SCHOFEELD, JUDGE
Defendants.

This case is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Orders
Extending Judgment. Having heard the arguments and reviewed the memoranda of
counsel, I now issue this ruling granting the motion.
Analysis & Ruling
This motion presents two issues for determination: first, is the alleged mistake of
law by the trial court sufficient to support a Rule 60(b) motion to remedy the mistake; and
second, is initiating a new suit based on a prior judgment within eight years of that
judgment the only way to avoid the running of the statute of limitations or can a party
renew the original suit through a motion to extend the judgment?
1

Rule 60(b) Motion to Remedy a Mistake
Two cases decided by the Utah Court of Appeals are particularly significant in
determining whether Rule 60(b) can be used as a vehicle to remedy the alleged mistake in
this case. Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 277 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Udy v. Udy,
907 P.2d 275, 277 (Utah App. 1995)), holds that a "'mistake of law by [a] trial court may
support a Rule 60(b) motion.'"1 In contrast, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin,
2 P.3d 451, 456-57 (Utah App. 2000), holds that "an appeal or motion for new trial,
rather than a 60(b) motion, is the proper avenue to redress mistakes of law committed by
the trial judge, as distinguished from clerical mistakes caused by inadvertence, especially
where the 60(b) motion is filed after the time for appeal has expired." When confronted
with this diametrically opposite case law, what is a trial court to do?
In my view, Franklin Covey provides the answer.
Quoting Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d §
2858 (1995) (citations omitted), the court explained:
We believe that
"'judicial error involving a fundamental misconception of the law should
be distinguished from inadvertent judicial oversight...,' and that [trial]
courts should be more willing to use Rule 60(b)(1) 'to correct a minor
oversight, such as the omission of damages, which in most cases would be
obvious, than . . . to correct a fundamental error of law, which in many
cases would not be as clear.'"

1

Similarly, Otteson v. State, 946 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah App. 1997), recognized that a Rule
60(b) motion could be used to correct a mistake of law.
2

Franklin Covey, 2 P.3d at 457.
In a case where the trial court has made a mistake as to a fundamental principle of
law and in which a final order has been issued, the appropriate forum for a remedy is an
appellate court.2
Applying the rule of Franklin Covey to the present case, it is clear that the proper
remedy for defendant when the trial court issued an order extending the judgment for an
additional eight years was an appeal.3 Use of Rule 60(b) was inappropriate.
Motion to Extend Judgment
As I noted in an oral ruling from the bench, the use of a motion to extend a
judgment is improper.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 provides that "[a]n action may be brought within
eight years: (1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any
state or territory within the United States . . . . " This statute performs two functions.
First, it establishes a statute of limitations for judgments. Second, and of primary
importance in this matter, it establishes the method for preserving a judgment against the
running of the statute of limitations. It provides that "an action may be brought" to

2

This circumstance is distinguished from the case where a trial judge makes an obvious
error, such as in completing a form of judgment, which the trial court should have the first
opportunity to remedy. Likely this analysis provides an explanation for the different results
reached in Bischel and Franklin Covey.
3

Defendant may argue that the order extending the judgment for an additional eight
years was not a final order. He would be wrong. It finally resolved, on the merits, the issue
then before the court. Given the ruling of the court, no other relief or order was necessary. As
such, the order was final and appealable.
3

preserve a judgment.4
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3(a) provides that a civil action is commenced by
the filing of a complaint with the court. When this rule is applied in conjunction with
section 78-12-22, it is clear that the preservation of a judgment against the eight-year
statute of limitations is only accomplished through the filing of a civil action-the filing of
a complaint.5
In a 1965 ruling the Utah Supreme Court reached the same conclusion:
A money judgment forms the basis for but two legal proceedings:
(1) a suit thereon brought within eight years, wherein it forms the basis or
chose in action for a new judgment, or (2) some form of proceeding in
execution for collection. Rule 69(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides that process to enforce a judgment shall be by writ of execution
which may issue at any time within eight years after the entry of judgment.
Thus, there is imposed an eight-year limitation period on the two basic
legal proceedings on a judgment, without any indication of an intent upon
the part of the legislature to extend the period . . . .
Yergensen v. Ford, 402 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1965). Restated, Yergensen allows for but
two legal proceedings resulting from a money judgment: a new lawsuit to reestablish the

4

Similarly, essentially all of the other sections of the chapter on statutes of limitations
use the noun "action". For example, in a claim on a written contract "[a]n action may be
brought within six years . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. For a contract claim not founded
on a writing, "[a]n action may be brought within four years
" Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.
5

Also of interest is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-46 which provides: "The word 'action' as
used in this chapter [which would include section 78-12-22, of interest in this case] is to be
construed, whenever it is necessary to do so, as including a special proceeding of a civil
nature." This section has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include proceedings to
appoint administrators for tax collection purposes, a statutory creation under a prior version of
the state tax code. The section therefore only serves to clarify that an "action" includes
proceedings which arefiledwith the court in the form of a separate proceeding. A motion does
not fit this framework.
4

claim, or a collection proceeding. Yergensen does not recognize the use of a motion
under such circumstances.
Plaintiffs rely on McCarthy v. Johnson, 35 F.Supp.2d 846 (D. Utah 1997), which
held that under Utah law a judgment creditor is entitled to renew a judgment by motion in
the original action, rather than by bringing a new, separate action. In reaching this
conclusion, the federal district court dismissed the Supreme Court's statement on the
issue in Yergensen. Instead it concluded that because a renewal proceeding, or an action
to revive a prior judgment, is so closely related to the original suit, it is unnecessary to file
a second, independent action. McCarthy, 35 F.Supp.2d at 849.
While there is no question that a subsequent action to enforce a judgment has a
significant relation to the original suit, that the new action is not a continuation of the
original suit was made clear in Lund v. Donihue, 674 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1983) (quoting
Orton v. Adams, AAA P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1968) ("The lien of a renewal judgment attaches
only from the date of the entry of the renewal judgment, and does not relate back to the
date of the entry of the judgment thus renewed nor extend the lien of the first
judgment.")).
Finally, the court in McCarthy argued from Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193
(Utah App. 1993), and Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah 2000), that
"[a] renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment...."
Barber, 800 P.2d at 797; and as such, "it is immaterial whether we designate a renewal
proceeding as a continuation of the original proceeding or as a collateral order." Von
5

Hake, 858 P.2d at 196. Using that language the McCarthy court concluded that a
judgment could be renewed by motion. I find it interesting, however, that even the
McCarthy court could find not Utah case which allowed the extension of a judgment by
motion, but rather, cited to a long list of Utah cases where "renewal of a judgment has
apparently proceeded by the filing of a complaint and its service on the judgment debtor."
McCarthy, 35 F.Supp.2d at 848. While Barber and Von Hake each state that an action
renewing a judgment is part of the original action (and thus imply that a new complaint
may not be necessary), in each case the method followed to preserve the judgment was
the filing of a new action. I am not persuaded that McCarthy gave appropriate attention
to the language of the statute, where in limitations statute after limitations statute the
express wording provides that "[a]n action may be brought

"

Conclusion
In sum, I concluded, and ruled from the bench, that the appropriate method to
extend a judgment was by a new action, a new complaint. In this case the court was
wrong to extend the judgment by motion. Because, however, the correct remedy for
defendant to seek correction of judicial error was an appeal from the order extending the
judgment rather than a Rule 60(b) motion, I deny his motion to set aside orders extending
judgment.6

6

I note, parenthetically, that this may not be the end of the issue. Certainly an argument
can be made that the order extending the judgment was ultra vzVes-outside of the authority of
the court. As such, it may not have the intended effect and the statute of limitations provided
by Section 78-12-22 already may have run. That, however, is a matter for another day when
some judgment enforcement mechanism is attempted.
6

Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, plaintiffs' counsel
is directed to prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this £_ day of March, 2002.

BY THE COURT:

7
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